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The National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) is a legislature in every way but one. It drafts uni-
form acts, debates them, passes them, and promulgates them, but that
passage and promulgation do not make these uniform acts law over
any citizen of any state. These acts become the law of the various
states only ex proprio vigore - only if their own vitality influences the
legislators of the various states to pass them.1
An inescapable question for an elite legislature such as the Com-
missioners is how to get its laws enacted. How can it decide before the
fact whether a particular law has the vitality to make it through the
decisive state legislatures? By examining one of the early failures of
the National Conference, I hope to show some of the sources of and
the limits upon its power as an elite legislature.
The Conference, of course, is different from conventional legisla-
tures in more than one way. Although the Commissioners are techni-
cally public officials, they are an elite group. Most of the
Commissioners are prominent lawyers not chosen on the same basis
used to choose a legislator, but chosen because they have a more intel-
lectual interest in uniform law than would a typical legislator. They
are elected not by a vote of the electorate but by the single vote of the
governor. This mode of election doubtless removes the Commission-
ers farther from the people than the typical state legislator; it also pro-
duces a group that is much more sophisticated in the law and more
interested in long-range questions than they would be if they had to
stand for reelection every two or four years.
For the purpose of this article, I assume that the product of such
an elite legislature is technically superior to the product of most state
legislatures and at least the equivalent of what Congress itself could
produce. Of course, technical competence is far down the list of things
that commend particular legislation to state legislatures and even fur-
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I thank Jeffrey Seifman,
'92, and David Kravitz, '93, for their work on this article.
1. Of course, in some circumstances the Commissioners may have success by adopting a law
proposed by a group such as bankers, lawyers, business groups or others, who themselves have
sufficient legislative influence to get the law passed.
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ther down on the list of the public at large. Yet the principal argu-
ment that the Commissioners can make on behalf of a uniform law
when it is considered by a state legislature is its technical and substan-
tive superiority over a law born in the back room of a state legislature
and sired by a lobbying organization.
This then is a fundamental problem of any elite legislature that
lacks the power to cause its legislation to be adopted. What legislation
is appropriate? What can be passed? What does the answer to those
questions tell about the legislation that should be undertaken, the
mode of drafting and adoption, and the acts that are necessary and
appropriate to achieve adoption? If every uniform act proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners were adopted by most of the
fifty state legislatures, the Conference would be a legislature in every
sense. If, on the other hand, few such acts were ever adopted by more
than a handful of legislatures, the Commissioners would be no more
than a group of officious citizens.
HISTORY OF THE CONFERENCE
The exact origin of the NCCUSL is somewhat obscure, but it is
clearly tied to the American Bar Association (ABA) and to its found-
ing in 1878. One of the purposes of the ABA was to prompt "uni-
formity of legislation throughout the Union.' '2 Other bar associations
took up the call for uniform legislation and doubtless had an impact
on the formation of the NCCUSL. 3 In 1888 a proposal was intro-
duced in the legislature of New York to create "commissioners for the
promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States."' 4 Shortly
thereafter the American Bar Association passed a resolution recom-
mending that each state adopt an act similar to that proposed in New
York.5 In 1890 the New York legislature approved the proposal, and
in 1892 the NCCUSL's first meeting was held in Saratoga, New
York.6
Eventually all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico appointed Commissioners and have taken part in the acts of the
National Conference. Even from the earliest time, however, people
2. Constitution, 3 A.B.A. REp. 50 (1880).
3. For example, in December 1881 the Alabama Bar Association created a committee to
confer with members of other bar associations regarding the possibility of uniform state legisla-
tion on "questions of national importance." Young, Uniform State Laws 8 A.B.A. J. 181, 182
(1922).
4. Hart, The Movement for Uniform State Laws; 23 CASE & COM. 646, 646-47 (1917).
5. Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws; 13 A.B.A. REP. 336, 337 (1890).
6. Hart, supra note 4, at 647.
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differed about the appropriate and feasible form of uniform legislation.
The original New York law contemplated uniform laws on "marriage
and divorce, insolvency and the form of notarial certificates." ' 7 The
American Bar Association resolution added laws dealing with descent,
distribution of property, acknowledgment of deeds, execution and pro-
bate of wills.8 All of these topics were then thought to be uniquely
state law questions, beyond the interest, ken, and even the constitu-
tional reach of the Congress.
Originally the Commissioners held the naive assumption that the
law could be "found" and stated.9 The original plan contemplated
"put[ting] in statutory form... established principles to be found in a
long line of cases" 10 on "all subjects where uniformity is deemed desir-
able and practicable."" Where authority differed, the NCCUSL was
to follow the greatest authority.1 2 Repeatedly the Commissioners
have drawn the distinction between law reform - a topic not within
the authority of the NCCUSL - and codification of existing
principles.
13
As any student of modem law knows, even the modest business of
choosing between divergent authority is a reform and a change in the
law at least in the state whose common law rule is rejected. But more
fundamentally, any attempt to codify a body of common law necessar-
ily presents the drafters irresistible opportunities to state rules that had
been only vaguely articulated or deeply buried in the cases. In one
sense, each of these statements of the law is more than a mere codifica-
tion of existing principles. Notwithstanding that fact, now so obvious,
the bar associations, either out of willful ignorance or because they
had not thought about it, insisted on the more limited goal for the
NCCUSL: "It is exclusively the province of this committee to make
uniform, so far as it may, the existing laws of the various states on the
subjects of interstate application.... [I]ts duty does not lie at all in the
7. Id.
8. Report supra note 5, at 337.
9. The drafters of the Restatements proceeded on a similar assumption. See, eg., REsTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS xi (1932) ('The function of the [American Law] Institute is to state clearly
and precisely in the light of the decisions the principles and rules of the common law."). Perhaps
their naivet6 was less excusable than that of the Commissioners, since the ReStatements were not
designed to be enacted into law at all.
10. Smith, Progress of Uniform State Laws, 81 CENT. LJ. 76, 78 (1915).
11. Young, supra note 3, at 182.
12. Smith, supra note 10, at 78. See generally Ailshie, Limits of Uniformity in State Laws, 13
A.B.A. J. 633 (1927).
13. See. e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
1986-87 REFERENCE BOOK 97-98 (1986).
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direction of promulgating new statutes."14
Although the NCCUSL occasionally made self-conscious decisions
to "reform," 15 the admonitions against novelty have continued. For
example, in 1929 the Committee on Scope and Program reiterated:
"As a rule the Conference should avoid entirely novel subjects with
regard to which neither legislative nor administrative experience is
available." 16 The issue again arose in 1958 where the NCCUSL pro-
posed new "model" acts.17 The Commissioners contemplated model
acts as those where wide adoption would be impossible because of the
local notions of the question addressed or for other reasons.' 8
Even the most recent pronouncement of the Conference published
in 1988 states that as a general rule the Conference should avoid acts
on subjects that are "entirely novel and with regard to which neither
legislative nor administrative experience is available."' 9 While one no
longer sees the assertion that the Conference should merely codify,
novelty is still forbidden, at least in circumstances where there is no
track record (and presumably where novelty cannot be hidden in the
disguise of codification).
The expansion ofdthe power of the federal government by Supreme
Court decision commencing in 1942 with Wickard v. Filburn20 and
the subsequent congressional exercise of that power in areas formerly
14. American Bar Assn. Comm. on Uniform State Laws, Report of the Committee of Uni-
form State Laws 2 A.B.A. J. 661, 661-62 (1916).
15. THE UNIFORM WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 299 (1923), was surely one
example. The Commissioners' adoption of such a law is described as follows:
[W]hile this [workmen's compensation law] was a new reform and hardly included in the
original purpose of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, nevertheless the legislatures
were demanding legislation of this character and... it would be better to offer them a
perfect law at the beginning of the movement for this reform than to correct their mistakes
later ....
Robbins, What the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Are Doing for the People of the United
States, 75 CENT. LJ. 1, 1-2 (1912).
16. Recommendations as to Character and Consideration of Acts Prepared by the Committee
on Scope and Program and Approved by the Conference at Memphis in 1929, in NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE 319, 319 (1958) [hereinafter HANDBOOK, 1958].
17. Criteria for the Model Legislation as Approved by the Executive Committee at the 1957
Annual Meeting, in HANDBOOK, 1958, supra note 16, at 325.
18. Id
19. Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Considera-
tion of Acts, August 2, 1988, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 1990-91 REFERENCE BOOK § 3(I), at 107 (1990) [hereinafter REFERENCE BOOK].
20. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wikard upheld a penalty assessed under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1938 against a farmer, who exceeded his allotted quota of wheat, even though the
excess wheat was grown solely for consumption on the farm. According to the Court, "[t]hat
appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." 317 U.S. at 127-28. Thus, any
August 1991] 2099
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reserved by law or custom to the states has intensified the Commis-
sioners' uncertainty and anxiety about their role. Obvious, but per-
haps worth noting, is the fact that the Commissioners owe their
existence to our federal constitutional system. Had the Constitution
granted all legislative power to the federal Congress and none to the
states, there never would have been a Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws nor any need for one. Initially the need for the
Conference arose because Congress was constitutionally foreclosed
from enacting laws concerning a number of matters thought to influ-
ence only a state or citizens of a particular state. Any nineteenth-
century lawyer would have said that such matters as private tort
claims, private contract, rules on bills of exchange, security interests,
insurance, and a host of other matters were beyond the power of Con-
gress. If these matters were beyond the power of Congress, yet the
states were to enact laws concerning them, there was obviously a place
for a body to promote uniformity.
With cases like Wickard, Perez v. United States,21 and Katzenbach
v. McClung,22 the constitutional barriers that had excluded the Con-
gress from these areas were torn down. Today it is difficult to imagine
an event so local or so remote from interstate commerce that the Con-
gress could not enact a law concerning it. To the extent Congress
chooses to exercise this new power, it will have extinguished the need
for the NCCUSL.
Examples of congressional encroachment on what had been for-
merly regarded as the territory of the states abound. Of particular
concern to the Commissioners must be cases such as the truth-in-lend-
ing law23 where Congress snatched a few pages from the NCCUSL's
own act, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and enacted them as
federal law.24 Other parts of the federal consumer credit legisla-
action with the slightest possible effect on interstate commerce was within the purview of con-
gressional regulation, as long as the "many others similarly situated" rationale was available.
21. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Perez was a loan shark convicted under Title II of the federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act. Although Perez was apparently a purely intrastate loan shark,
the Court upheld his conviction on the grounds that he was "clearly a member of the class which
engages in 'extortionate credit transactions' as defined by Congress," which class had been deter-
mined by Congress to "directly affect interstate and foreign commerce." 402 U.S. at 153, 147
n.1. Hence despite a total lack of evidence that Perez had any effect whatsoever on interstate
commerce, his conviction was upheld since others belonging to his "class" did affect interstate
commerce.
22. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). This case upheld the application, under the commerce clause, of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to a restaurant that refused to allow blacks to sit in its dining room, on the
grounds that it .had purchased food that at one time had moved in interstate commerce.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r.
24. During hearings on a precursor to the truth-in-lending law, Senator Proxmire stated that
he was "sure that the committee, when it [marked] up the bill, [would] take into very careful
consideration, and... adopt, a number of the suggestions" made by the NCCUSL's representa-
2100 [Vol. 89:2096
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tion2
s and the Federal Reserve's Regulation CC26 have gradually ap-
propriated a significant portion of the rules on consumer credit and
transfer of checks among banks to the federal government. 27 Today
few doubt the power of Congress to enact laws that would affect tort
liability in all of the states,28 or laws concerning insurance, or laws
concerning the licensing and operation of a variety of other businesses.
Does all of this mean that the Conference is merely a vestigial in-
stitution whose purpose has disappeared? I think not, but let me ex-
plain. The original constitutional division of legislative power between
the states and the federal Congress arose to some extent out of fear of
tive. Truth in Lending; 1967 Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1967) (statement of
William J. Pierce, chairman, Executive Committee, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law).
At least some of Professor Pierces suggestions from the UCCC seem to have found their way
into the enacted legislation. One commentator noted that "while the UCCC was necessarily
revised in its final draft to conform to the disclosure requirements of the CCPA, it can likewise be
demonstrated without dispute that the earlier drafts of the UCCC substantially affected the final
result of the federal statute." Moo, Legislative Control of Consumer Credit TransactionS 33 LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROBS. 656, 662 (1968). This view was shared by at least some of the Commission-
ers, who proclaimed that "[a] substantial number of the provisions in the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act (Truth in Lending) and in Regulation Z issued by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, are traceable to the U3C." Variations to Code in Enacting States:
Report No. 1 of the Committee on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, at 2 (1972).
The 1968 text of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code contained extensive disclosure provi-
sions, see U.C.C.C. §§ 2.301-313, 3.301-312 (1968), designed to exempt an enacting state from
the federal truth-in-lending law under § 123 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1633. By 1974, the drafters
of the UCCC had given up, and the Code simply required compliance with applicable federal
law. See U.C.C.C. § 3.201 (1974).
25. Eg., the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693 (West 1982).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1991).
27. Professor Rubin gives considerable insight into the "federalization" of the payment sys-
tem embodied in the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988) and in
Regulation CC and other regulations of the Federal Reserve. He argues:
The federalization of the check collection law cannot be ascribed to a loss of faith in
federalism or to some moral lapse on the part of freedom loving citizens. Rather, it is the
product of positive forces: the demand for a uniform regulatory approach that exercises
operational, supervisory control over the check collection system and the emergence of a
politically powerful movement with nationwide norms and access to a national deci-
sionmaker. The demand for regulation generated the Expedited Funds Availability Act,
and with its passage, the era of state law control over the payment system is coming to an
end.
Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from the Pay-
ment System, 49 Osno ST. LJ. 1251, 1276 (1989).
28. See, e-g., S.2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This unenacted bill was entitled the "Liti-
gation Abuse Reform Act of 1986." Based on a finding that "the cost of litigation and the size of
settlements and judgments in tort litigation have direct and undesirable consequences on inter-
state commerce, and on the availability of products and services nationwide," id, § 2(a)(4), the
bill would have regulated all negligence, strict or product liability, and malpractice claims. See
ha § 3(a). It would have limited awards ofnoneconomic damages to $100,000, reduced damage
awards by the amount of collateral source recovery (such as health insurance), required paying
punitive damages to the U.S. Treasury rather than to the plaintiff, and imposed triple liability for
costs on attorneys who file frivolous suits. Id.
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centralized government and of the power that such a government
would wield. That idea was well expressed at the time of the drafting
of the Constitution29 and was frequently on the lips of nineteenth-cen-
tury politicians and statesmen. 30 With the removal of the constitu-
tional barriers against federal laws governing most elements of a
private citizen's life, the same fear that caused the constitutional barri-
ers in 1789 should again trouble the citizens, now exposed to federal
power.
Ironically, the NCCUSL may find this new-found fear of federal
power to be a reason for their organization. Conceivably the Commis-
sioners can be a rallying point for the states against federal encroach-
ment. In 1910, long before Wickard v. Filburn, a news account noted
that President Taft had suggested as much:
The cry against overcentralization of the government would be hushed if
the states worked in harmony with each other in their law making;
otherwise, as Senator Root predicted two years ago, Congress will be
urged to effect for the whole country the laws which conditions demand
and the state statutes fail to supply.31
That the Commissioners' role might be to fill the void that would
otherwise be filled by federal law has not gone unnoticed by the Com-
missioners themselves. Commissioner Allison Dunham made the
point twenty-five years ago: "From the very beginning, including the
early reports of the American Bar Association, it has been a theme
that uniformity of law by voluntary state action was a means of re-
moving any excuse for the federal government to absorb powers
thought to belong rightfully to the states."'3 2
29. It is beyond a doubt that the new federal constitution, if adopted, will in a great
measure destroy, if it do not totally annihilate, the separate governments of the several
states. We shall, in effect, become one great Republic. - Every measure of any importance,
will be Continental.... From the moment we become one great Republic, either in form or
substance, the period is very shortly removed, when we shall sink first into monarchy, and
then into despotism.
An Old Whig IV, in FEDERALISTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 18 (J. Kaminski & R. Leffler eds. 1989) (anonymous essay pub-
lished in the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, Oct. 27, 1787). For numerous other examples
of commentary from the time of the Constitutional convention questioning the excessive power
of the federal government, see id passim.
30. Two examples: In 1812, Cyrus King of Massachusetts, opposing a federal draft of state
militiamen, said that "[s]uch arbitrary plans can only be calculated to destroy the Militia System,
and, of course, the sovereignty of the States." S. EDMuNDS, THE FEDERAL OCTOPUS IN 1933, at
7 (3d ed. 1933). In 1833, President Jackson vetoed a proposal to grant public land to various
states, on the grounds that "a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is
power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the States will all political
power be substantially concentrated." Id at 83.
31. Uniform State Laws Advocated by Taft, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1910, at 8, col. I (para-
phrasing remarks by President Taft).
32. Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (1965).
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Moreover, this fear of federal power may be enhanced because the
power is exercised not by a ponderous, deliberative body such as the
Congress, but by agencies of the federal government such as the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, the Federal Communications Commission or the
Federal Trade Commission. For example, bankers seeking a particu-
lar set of rules to determine the banks' liability to customers might
have more confidence in the stability of those rules if they were stated
in a uniform state law that could be changed only by the acts of state
legislatures than if the rules were found in regulations authorized by
Congress, but promulgated by theFederal Reserve Board. Under fed-
eral agencies, such regulations can be changed on short notice and
with modest debate.
The tearing down of the constitutional barriers should give the Na-
tional Conference legitimate anxiety about their place in the new and
less federalist society. Yet that same expansion of federal power may
ultimately strengthen their position if they can fill the void before the
Congress and the federal agencies do so.
HISTORY OF UNIFoRM LEGISLATION BY THE NCCUSL
Since 1892 NCCUSL has promulgated over 200 uniform acts. 33
Because amendments to existing acts are often described as new acts
- for instance, the article 2A proposed in 198734 - the true number
of acts is subject to debate. But however one counts, it is clear that
much of the Commissioners' seed has fallen on barren ground. Of the
more than 200 uniform acts, 107 have been adopted by fewer than ten
states; seventy-seven of those have not made the grade in even five
states, and a number of the uniform acts have earned zero adoptions. 35
Many of the unsuccessful acts have been withdrawn or superseded by
other acts; these are no longer included in the listing of uniform laws.
The Commissioners have had great successes as well. Twenty-two
acts have been adopted by more than forty states. 36 Because the Uni-
33. REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 19, at 2.
34. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 2A (1987), 4 U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 1991); see also U.C.C. art.
9 (1972), 5 U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1991).
35. These statistics come from tables in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 279-85, 362-65
(1984); and REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 19, at 110-13. The zero club includes, inter alia, the
UNF. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 10 U.L.A. 1 (1987), UNIF. FRANCHISE AND BusINESS
OPPORTUNITIES ACT, 7 U.LA. 77 (1987), UNIF. LAND SECURrrY INTEREST ACT, 7A U.L.A.
146 (1985), UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT, 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980), and the UNIF. SUCCESSION
WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION ACT, 8 U.L.A. 223 (1983). Another zero club member was the
1900 Divorce Act, see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
36. The 22 acts are as follows: REVISED UNIF. CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT, 11 U.L.A. 51
(1936), superseded by UNIF. EXTRADITION AND RENDITION ACT, 11 U.L.A. 157 (1980); NAR-
August 1991] 2103
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form Commercial Code superseded three of these previously success-
ful acts37 and is itself counted as at least three acts (the original Code,
the 1972 amendments to article 9, and 1977 amendments to article 8),
the number twenty-two slightly exaggerates the number of successes.
Before we turn to the unsuccessful divorce acts discussed in detail
below, consider the successful acts, those passed by more than forty
states. Successful acts can be classified in many ways; for this article, I
choose classes that tend to identify characteristics that make an act
successful: commercial acts, lawyer and court acts, and descent and
estate acts. The first category includes nine acts. 38 It contains the
queen of all uniform acts, the Uniform Commercial Code. Also in-
cluded are such important acts as the Uniform Partnership Act, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and the Uniform Arbitration Act.
Under the rubric "lawyer and court acts" we list things such as the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the Uniform Act to Secure the At-
tendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings,
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, and the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act. These categories are not perfect; for ex-
ample, one might include the Uniform Arbitration Act in the list of
lawyer matters and exclude it from the commercial law list. Finally
are acts having to do with distribution of decedents' estates; the Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act and the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
fit here.39 The NCCUSL has itself organized the acts under four cate-
coTnc DRUG ACT, 9B U.L.A. 7 (1958), superseded by UNiF. ACTS ON CONTROLLED SUB-
STANCES, 9 pt. II U.L.A. 1 (1990); NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, (1896), superseded by the
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, (1990); UNIF. STOCK TRANSFER AT, (1909), superseded by the
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, (1990); UNIF. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, (1906), superseded by
the UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, (1990); UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFr Aar, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1987);
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1956); UNIF. ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF
WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, 11 U.L.A. 1 (1936); UNE.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICION, 9 pt. I U.L.A. 115 (1968); UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, (1990);
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE - Article 8 (1977); UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE - Article 9, supra
note 34; UNIF. ACTS ON CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, supra; UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
ACTS, 12 U.L.A. 109 (1922); DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY, 8 U.L.A. 275 (1987); UNIV.
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 181 (1964); UNIp. LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 239 (1985); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 3 (1914); RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381 (1968); UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 8
U.L.A. 557 (1953); UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT, 8 U.L.A. 559 (1960);
UNIF. VETERAN'S GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 8 U.L.A. 679 (1942).
37. The three superseded acts were NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, supra note 36, UNIF.
STOCK TRANSFER ACT, supra note 36, and UNri. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, supra note 36.
38. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, supra note 36; STOCK TRANSFER ACT, supra note 36;
UNIF. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, supra note 36; ARBITRATION ACT, supra note 36; UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 36; UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE - Article 8, supra note 36;
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE - Article 9, supra note 34; UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT,
supra note 36; UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, supra note 36.
39. Three of the 22 acts do not fit in any of the three categories: NARCOTIC DRUG ACT,
supra note 36, UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, supra note 36, UNIF. VETERANS'
GUARDIANSHIP ACT, supra note 36.
2104 [Vol. 89:2096
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gories based on technical aspects,40 but these are less informative as to
the factors of success.
The story of the success or failure of these acts is the story of the
limits on the power of an elite legislature. Presumably the Commis-
sioners who voted for and promulgated the 200 uniform acts would
have favored their adoption in every state. That more than half of
these acts have achieved no significant adoption is a statement about
the limited power of this legislature, and if one can learn from the
successes and failures of the Conference - about which acts are hope-
less and which are likely to find widespread adoption - the lesson
would be useful for the Commissioners. To the extent these lessons
also show the kind of laws that our legislatures will pass and the per-
sons to whom they listen, these successes and failures merit study by a
larger audience than just the Commissioners. Quite likely there are
some lessons buried here about the power of the states versus the
power of the Congress. There may be a message for citizen groups and
for quasi-official groups such as law revision commissions. There may
even be some clues about the American public's need for and attach-
ment to the idea of uniform laws. Finally, one might also learn here
about the limited importance of law as a control on human behavior.
Answers to these questions must wait for another day. I propose
to study them here by examining the public debate, the circumstances
of adoption, and the legislative fate of four early uniform acts on di-
vorce. The following description of the unsuccessful efforts to modify
the divorce law provides a basis for debating the proper role of uni-
form state laws and the attendant power, and limits on the power, of
the Commissioners.
40. The four categories are:
(1) Acts to facilitate the flow of commercial transactions across state lines ....
(2) Acts to avoid conflict of laws when the laws of more than one state may apply to a
transaction or series of transactions ....
(3) Acts to provide reciprocity as to rights and remedies between states and residents of
different states ....
(4) Acts without substantial interstate implications but conceived and drafted to fill
emergent needs, to modernize antiquated concepts, or to codify the common law ....
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 19, at 106.
Of the 22 successful acts, six (NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, supra note 36, STOCK
TRANSFER ACT, supra note 36, WAREHOUSE RECEnTS ACT, supra note 36, UNIF. COMMER-
CIAL CODE, supra note 36, U.C.C. Article 8, supra note 36, and U.C.C. Article 9, supra note 34)
fit into category 1; none fits in category 2; five (REVISED CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT, supra
note 36, UNIF. ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, supra note.36, ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, supra note 36, and RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT, supra note 36) fit in category 3; and the rest get stuck in the "catch-all" category 4.
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UNIFORM DIVORCE LEGISLATION
In 1906 the National "Congress" on divorce legislation issued the
following proclamation:
The great and constantly increasing number of divorces in the United
States has aroused a general public interest which has resulted in a wide-
spread movement for their restriction. As one result of the discussion of
this subject, there is a well founded belief that a part of this increase in
divorces, attended with special evils and scandals, is due to the lack of a
divorce law uniform throughout the nation.
The power to establish such uniform law has not been committed to
the Federal Government by the Constitution, except for the District of
Columbia and the territories, and the movement for restriction has
therefore been in the direction of securing action of the several states in
the passage of such law. In the message of President Roosevelt to the
Congress of the United States, on January 30, 1905 (sent at the instance
of the Interchurch Conference and requesting the continuance of the col-
lection of Divorce Statistics under Federal authority), he suggested such
co-operation of the states, in this language:
"The institution of marriage is of course at the very foundation of
our social organization, and all influences that affect that institution are
of vital concern to the people of the whole country. There is a wide-
spread conviction that the divorce laws are dangerously lax and indiffer-
ently administered in some of the states, resulting in a diminishing re-
gard for the sanctity of the marriage relation. The hope is entertained
that co-operation amongst the several states can be secured to the end
that there may be enacted upon the subject of marriage and divorce uni-
form laws, containing all possible safeguards for the security of the
family."4 1
So read the first three paragraphs of the address by the Committee
on Resolutions of the 1906 National Congress on Uniform Divorce
Laws. The report was addressed to the President and Congress of the
United States and to the governors and legislatures of the states and
territories. By their reference to the data on divorce, to the "general
public interest," to the limits on the power of the federal government,
to the action of the interchurch conference in calling for the National
Congress and to the general statement of the President concluding
that "divorce laws are dangerously lax," these paragraphs identify
many of the actors in the attempt to change the divorce laws. They
capture the general motivation of the proponents of change and public
expression of concern for and disapproval of the existing divorce law.
41. Address of the Committee on Resolutions. in NATIONAL CONGRESS ON UNIFORM DI-
VORCE LAWS, ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS, UNIFORM LAW RELATING TO ANNULMENT OF MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE AND LAWS RELATING TO RETURN OF STATISTICS ADOPTED BY THE
NATIONAL CONGRESS ON UNIFORM DIVORCE LAWS AT WASHINGTON, FEB. 19-23, 1906, AND
PHILADELPmA, Nov. 13-14, 1906, at 1-2 (1906) [hereinafter Address & Resolutions].
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This general upheaval in favor of restrictions on divorce law and
the actions that followed produced four uniform laws, one passed in
1900, superseded by two others in 1901, and those in turn superseded
by the fourth, promulgated in 1907 by the NCCUSL. The fourth act
had been adopted by the National Congress of 1906; the three
paragraphs quoted above refer to it.
Despite the interest of the churches, the apparent general public
interest, and President Roosevelt's view about the need for change in
the law, these proposals were a dismal failure. No state adopted the
1900 Act.42 The uniform laws promulgated in 1901 were together
adopted in only two states,43 and only Delaware, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin adopted the law of 1907.
44
I first recite some of the events that preceded and attended the
attempt to modify the divorce laws of the states. By examining the
apparent motives of the proponents and opponents, I will try to ex-
plain why the uniform divorce laws were unsuccessful and to extrapo-
late from this experience to other cases where the uniform laws have
been or might be proposed.
To set the stage for the debate, I first review the law and the prac-
tice as it existed at the turn of the century. At that time, South Caro-
lina did not permit divorce at all,4s and the most important player in
the state legislative game, New York, permitted divorce only on the
ground of adultery.46 An early twentieth-century commentator de-
scribed the grounds for divorce in the various states as follows:
First, let us take that section comprised of Virginia, North Carolina,
Kentucky and Tennessee. An examination of the laws of these states
will disclose the fact that there are twenty-two grounds of absolute di-
vorce recognized by one or the other of the four.
Of the twenty-two grounds, but two are common among the four
states, namely: - (a) Adultery and (b) Pregnancy of wife at time of
marriage unknown to husband. Of the remaining twenty grounds, but
two are common to three states (Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee), (a)
Abandonment, etc. (b) Conviction of felony, etc. Two others are com-
42. STATE BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF ELEVENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT DENVER,
COLORADO, AUG. 19 AND 20, 1901, at 8 (1901) (Report of Amasa Eaton and S.A. Williams)
[hereinafter 1901 REPORT].
43. Acts Drafted by Other Organizations and Approved by the National Conference, in NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIFrIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 448, 449 (1940).
44. Ma The 1907 Act was withdrawn by the Conference in 1928. IdM
45. Article 17, § 3 of the 1895 Constitution of South Carolina reads: "Divorce from the
bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed in this State." S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 3 (1895).
46. N.Y. CODE OF Clv. PROC. § 1756 (1902).
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mon to Kentucky and Tennessee - (a) Cruelty, etc. (b) Habitual drunk-
enness, etc., while seven of the remaining sixteen grounds are recognized
only in Tennessee, six only in Kentucky, two only in Virginia, and one
only in North Carolina.47
The same author found that adultery was the only ground com-
mon to all seven of the states in New England, that abandonment and
cruelty were common to six, and that there were other miscellaneous
grounds, such as habitual drunkenness, conviction of a felony, impo-
tency, and several others that were recognized only by a few of the
seven states.4
8
Some Western states had divorce laws considerably more lenient
than their Eastern counterparts. South Dakota, for example, allowed
divorce on six grounds: adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion,
wilful neglect, habitual intemperance, and conviction for felony.49 It
also adopted broad definitions of some of the grounds, including "in-
fliction of... grievous mental suffering" within the definition of cru-
elty,50 and refusal to have intercourse and selecting an unreasonable
mode of living within desertion.51 There is no mention of any waiting
period for effectiveness of the court's decree, although a six-month res-
idence in the state was required.52 Grounds for divorce in Montana
were identical to those in South Dakota, with some minor variation in
the definitions.53 Colorado listed ten grounds for divorce, but the only
major addition to the list was impotence.5 4 Neither of the latter two
states imposed any waiting period after the decree before it became
final. The residence provisions differed somewhat: Montana required
the plaintiff to have been a resident for one year,55 while Colorado had
no specific requirement other than that the plaintiff actually be a resi-
dent if the offense complained of happened within the state.5 6 In some
of the western states the formal residence requirements appear to have
been winked at.57
47. Wise, Shall Congress Establish Uniform Divorce Laws?, 11 THE BRiEF 299, 309-10 (1911)
(footnote omitted).
48. Id at 310-11. The seven states are Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Is-
land, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine.
49. 2 S.D. STAT. ANN. § 3470 (1901).
50. 2 S.D. STAT. ANN. § 3472 (1901).
51. 2 S.D. STAT. ANN. § 3473(1), (9) (1901).
52. 2 S.D. STAT. ANN. § 3489 (1901).
53. See MONT. CIV. CODE §§ 130-145 (1895).
54. See COLO. STAT. ANN. § 1562 (1891).
55. MONT. CIv. CODE § 176 (1895).
56. COLO. STAT. ANN. § 1564 (1891).
57. The New York Times reported a case of a New York woman who took advantage of the
western laws to get a divorce she otherwise could not get:
She told her friends that she was going West to get a divorce. She notified the telephone
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Even in circumstances in which a party was a proper resident of
the state where he or she sought divorce, there was the question of
appropriate service on or notice to a nonresident defendant. All
seemed to concede it was appropriate to grant divorces against absent
defendants, but the questions how to give notice to that defendant and
how to assure the satisfaction of due process for that person were
troublesome.58
One looking at these divorce laws and examining the popular
claims about divorce practice might have identified some combination
of three issues as "the problem." First were those who simply thought
divorce too freely granted; they would have favored general restric-
tions on the availability of divorce. Doubtless many of the churchmen
held this view; it was probably the view of those who supported New
York's single cause divorce law. Alternatively, one might conclude
that the evil was not that too many divorces were granted, but that one
state might grant a divorce to a resident of another state. This was the
problem of so-called "migratory" divorces, and it was thought particu-
larly acute for states like New York with restrictive laws. Finally
there was the problem of the due process rights of the absent spouse.
Even advocates of more generous divorce laws could have joined pro-
ponents of divorce restriction out of concern over the third question.
It was divergent grounds for divorce - in law and in application
- that produced all of the problems under the second heading and
most of those under the third. If the substantive law and the applica-
tion of that law in New York, New Jersey, and South Dakota had been
the same, there would have been no need for New Yorkers to pretend
to be residents of New Jersey or South Dakota, and to procure di-
vorces there on the basis of inadequate notice to their spouses in New
York and in violation of the laws of New York.
As early as the 1880s one-sees discussion of the inadequacy of the
divorce law and consideration of the problem of migratory divorce. In
1883, a reader of the New York Times, who describes himself as having
"'passed through the mill,' "wrote to criticize the inconsistency of the
divorce law.59 He complained that a woman not only could continue
company in New York to take her name out of the telephone book, but took great care to
warn her friends that she was at home and could be communicated with by telephone. She
went out to the Western States and engaged rooms, returned to New York, and in due
course of time, after a sufficient number of days of residence required by the statute had
expired, she again went from New York to the State and came back with a divorce decree in
her hand.
N.Y. Times, July 5, 1908, at 8, col. 4 (quoting Barratt, Migratory American Divorces - Their
International Status - Is a Central Registry Practicable?, 17 YALE L.J. 589, 592 (1908)).
58. See, e-g., COLO. STAT. ANN. § 1563 (1891).
59. An Anomaly in Divorce Law, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1883, at 3, col. 5.
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to use her husband's name, but that after a divorce she could go to
another state and get married and return to New York even though
the law of New York would keep her from remarrying were she the
defendant in the original divorce action.60
VOICE OF THE CLERGY
In 1890 the New York Times reported the tenth annual meeting of
a Boston group called the National Divorce Reform League.61 The
Reverend Dr. Samuel W. Dike, the corresponding secretary of that
group, reportedly stated: "[tihe spirit of reform has apparently com-
pletely checked the increase of loose legislation, and has resulted in
few better laws in some States, but the great work is as yet almost
untouched. ' 62 This seems the first recognition of the need for uniform
laws.
During this time various church officials and organizations were
active in proposing changes in the law. In 1883 and 1898 organs of
the Episcopal Church proposed changes in the laws of some of the
states and at least considered proposals concerning a uniform law on
divorce.63 In 1899 the Right Reverend William Crosswell Doane, the
Episcopalian bishop of the diocese of Albany, published a long essay in
the New York Times on the "Question of Divorce and Remarriage."
64
In that essay he specifically discussed a proposal of the National Com-
missioners on Uniform Laws (apparently the proposal that became the
1900 uniform act). Although Reverend Doane endorsed the uniform
60. IM Complaints about divorce were often associated with complaints about the ease of
marriage. On October 27, 1883, the New York Times in an editorial bemoaned sham marriages
done "'in fun'" as part of a "'game.'" It admonished those who make fun of divorce by sham
marriages as follows:
We pride ourselves in this country on the complete freedom which is given to our girls, but
when young people use that freedom in burlesquing marriage it is time to ask whether the
nursery is not the proper place for them, until they can learn how to conduct themselves
decently if not sensibly.
Married in Fun, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1883, at 4, col. 5. In 1892 the Homeopathic Medical
Society proposed the prohibition of marriages "among those tainted by heredity with crime,
insanity or disease.. . ." It proposed the "enactment of suitable scientific laws restricting such
marriages." Would Restrict Marriages - The Homeopaths Vote to Appeal to the Legislature,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1892, at 4, col. 7.
61. Divorce Reform League - Legislation Needed to Secure the Family Relation, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1890, at 6, col. I [hereinafter Divorce Reform League].
62. Id
63. See Calling for New Divorce Laws N.Y. Times, May 13, 1883, at 1, col. 6. At an 1898
meeting in Washington, D.C. the Episcopalian bishops declined to pass a resolution endorsing
the uniform law and considered the question whether to change the rule prohibiting remarriage
of divorced persons, but decided to leave the rule as it stood. The Episcopal Council - Bishops
Decide to Take No Action on Question of Remarriage of Divorced Persons N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1898, at 12, col. 4.
64. Doane, The Question of Divorce and Remarriage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1899, at 23, col.
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law to the extent it restricted the opportunities for divorce and prompt
remarriage after divorce, he had some doubts about the proposal then
under consideration:
[W]hile I dread the attempt to provide one marriage law for all the
states, lest in the effort to lift the lowest we lower the highest standards
of the civil law; I am very thankful for the recommendation of the Na-
tional Commissioners on uniform laws in certain of their details; requir-
ing a residence in good faith for a year; allowing no divorce for any cause
previous to residence unless it be a cause in the State whence the peti-
tioner comes; nor for cause arising in the State without two years delay;
divorce to be granted only on trial in open session, and the decree to be
inoperative for six months if the defendant fail to appear.65
From the letters to the Times one can tell the clergy were not bashful
in speaking from the pulpit on the evils of divorce and, presumably, in
favor of laws restricting divorce.
66
THE "EvILS" OF EARLY DIVORCE LAW
The newspapers also contain anecdotal descriptions of the evil con-
sequences in particular cases of conflicting laws and of the failure of
various states to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other
states. The point is made as follows in a commentary in the New York
Times in 1876.
It is true that the Federal Constitution provides that full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to "the public acts, records, and judi-
cial proceedings" of every other State. This might be interpreted to
mean that a divorce obtained in Indiana must necessarily be recognized
as lawful by the courts of this State. In actual practice, however, such
recognition is by no means universally given. If the divorce has been
obtained by fraud, it is, of course, held by our courts to be inoperative.
There are, however, many cases in which it is uncertain whether a for-
eign divorce obtained in a perfectly regular way, is not worthless outside
of the State in which it was obtained. For example, a wife residing in
this State may leave her husband and go to Indiana, and after residing
there as long as the Indiana statute requires, procure a divorce for some
cause not permitted by the New-York statute. Whether this divorce
65. Id.
66. In a sermon, the Reverend Mr. Hamilton denounced "home wreckers" and asked for the
social ostracism of divorced people in general. Layman, "Regarding Divorced Persons;" N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1899, at 6, col. 7 (letter to the editor) (quoting Rev. Hamilton). His statement
from the pulpit brought a letter from one reader of the Times who was critical of his strong
stand, i&, and from another critical because the Reverend did not go far enough. The latter
writer condemned the Reverend because he was "lacking in the courage of his opinions when he
mildly suggested that society should frown upon divorces 'as a favor to the Church,'" adding
that if they would 'do such kindness to the Church,' God would reward them." The writer
commented, "[hias the worship so influenced teachers of the Gospel that they must timidly beg
as a favor what it is their duty to demand as a prerogative?" D.R., "Home Wreckers in Society,"
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1899, at 6, col. 7 (letter to the editor).
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would be held good by our courts is a question that is by no means
settled. The fact that the wife left the State expressly to accomplish what
she could not accomplish under the New-York State laws would cause
the courts to look with suspicion upon her conduct. The legal theory
that a wife's residence is the same as that of her husband might be con-
strued to mean that she could not, by leaving him and going to Indiana,
obtain a legal residence there which would be sufficient to give the Indi-
ana courts jurisdiction over her. There would be, also, a question
whether the service of process upon the husband by publication in an
Indiana newspaper would be sufficient to give the Indiana court jurisdic-
tion over him. Thus, in spite of the Federal Constitution, the perfect
good faith of the wife, and the regularity of the proceedings in the Indi-
ana court, it would be uncertain whether she would be a wife or a di-
vorced woman in this State.67
In 1896 the New York Times quoted a New York judge's com-
plaint about the need of a special officer to look into the events of
default cases. 68 Presumably the judge was really complaining not
about "default," but about collusive divorces in which the parties al-
lege adultery even though none has occurred in order to achieve a
divorce contrary to the laws of New York. Another judge reported
that he performed the repugnant task of finding a New Yorker who
had procured an invalid Connecticut judgment to be a bigamist.
The case was that of a husband suing for absolute divorce from a wife
who had obtained a divorce from him in Connecticut, according to the
laws of that State, the husband not having been personally served, and
had married again in Connecticut. The husband's application was
granted, the court holding that, as to him, the Connecticut divorce and
marriage are void. On this state of things the comment of Judge MAT-
TICE was: "The Constitution of the United States requires that 'full faith
and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every
other State,' and, it is said, public policy requires one jurisdiction to ob-
serve as valid a marriage legally contracted in another jurisdiction,
Seemingly we do neither." 69
The New York Times also reported the case of a woman who,
claiming to have moved to another state where she was to get a di-
vorce, in fact remained in New York telling only her friends how to
contact her and avoiding all appearance of continued residence in New
York.70 In another case, the Times reported, an influential citizen suc-
67. Married or Singl. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1876, at 4, col. 5 (editorial).
68. Reform in Divorce Laws N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1896, at 14, col. 2.
69. Uniform Divorce Laws, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1899, at 18, col. 2. For other examples of
legal commentary critical of the current system and advocating the need for reform, see Not
Bigamy if You Wed Outside State N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1914, at 13, col. 3 (comments ofex-Judge
Dittenhoefer concerning men known to him with "undivorced wives"); Spurr, Uniform Divorce
Legislation, 17 CASE & COM. 17 (1911); Wise, supra note 47; Uniform Divorce Laws, 17 VA. L.
REG. 480 (1911).
70. See N.Y. Times, supra note 57.
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ceeded in changing the law in a minor way to enable him to remarry
after his divorce:
Nobody disputes the gravity of the evils entailed by varying divorce laws,
nor the openings for fraud which the variation makes.
... There has been, doubtless, much hasty and unconsidered State
legislation upon divorce. It has been known that a man of wealth and
influence has induced the Legislature of a State to pass a divorce law,
general in its terms, but in fact for the sole purpose of meeting his partic-
ular case.
71
These commentaries and anecdotes are all critical of the existing
divorce law and, for the most part, of divorce itself. An extensive di-
vorce study done by Col. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of the Na-
tional Bureau of Labor Statistics, fueled this fire.72 Submitted to
Congress in 1889, the report studied divorces in the United States
from 1867 through 1886. Although careful study of the report showed
certain alleged evils, such as migratory divorce, to be exaggerated,
73
the study did show a rapid rise in the number of divorces. Moreover,
it stated that the percentage of American marriages that ended in di-
vorce was substantially higher than similar percentages in European
countries.74 The study also showed that the percentage of divorces per
10,000 married persons had risen in every year, and that the total
number of divorces had increased by 157% at a time when the popula-
tion had increased by only 60%.75 As a result of the study, Colonel
Wright was invited to speak to church groups76 and probably to other
organizations interested in the divorce question. His findings became
71. For a Uniform Divorce Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1906, at 8, col. 2. The story about the
man in question, a Mr. Catlin, is reported in Romance of Divorce Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1879, at 12, col. 1. One might call this the Henry VIII approach to reforming divorce laws.
72. C. WRIGHT, A REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867 TO
1886 (1889).
73. The Reverend Samuel Dike, a major proponent of uniform divorce laws, conceded based
on the study that 80% of divorces occurred within the state where the marriage took place, "thus
dispelling a prevalent idea that a uniform national divorce law would remedy the evil." Divorce
Reform League, supra note 61.
74. The ratio of marriages to divorces in the United States between 1867 and 1886 ranged
from a low of 9.74 to 1 in New Hampshire to a high of 61.94 to 1 in Maryland. C. WRIGHT,
supra note 72, at 138-39. In contrast, Austria averaged around 240 to 1, England averaged 718
to 1, and Ireland averaged several thousand to 1. Id. at 986, 1017, 1018. One commentator
noted that "[t]he less number of divorces in European countries is due principally to the fact that
in a large number of them the church, as well as the law, forbids divorce." Krauskopf, The
Marring of the Marriage Bond, 14 AM. J. Soc. 780, 781 (1909).
75. C. WRIGHT, supra note 72, at 140.
76. See, eg., Marriage and Divorce -An Interesting Paper Read before the Unitarian Confer-
ence, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1891, at 3, col. 2 (Colonel Wright delivered a paper before the Unita-
rian Conference).
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the basis for debate about the need for reform.77
THE UNIFORM LAWS OF 1900 AND 1901
This public debate of the late nineteenth century had its first con-
crete impact on the Uniform Commissioners in 1899. In its August
1899 meeting, held in conjunction with the American Bar Association
meeting, at Buffalo, the Commissioners considered a proposed uni-
form law on divorce.78 Part of that draft became the 1900 act, "An
Act To Establish a Law Uniform with Regard to the Law of Other
States Relative To Divorce Procedure and Divorce from the Bonds of
Marriage." This first uniform law on divorce contained eight sections
and was promulgated in 1900. 79
77. See Montgomery, For Uniform Divorce Laws, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1904, at 6, col. 4
(citing Wright's statistics).
A second study published by the census bureau in 1909, see The Story of Divorce Court
Records Tell N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1909, § 5 (Magazine), at 4, col. 1, seems to have had little
impact on the debate. It compared the divorce rates among the various states and confirmed
what had been claimed all along, namely, certain of the western states, particularly Colorado,
Montana, and Washington, had quite high divorce rates, whereas certain eastern states, notably
South Carolina, New York, and Pennsylvania, had quite low rates. It showed that the total
number of divorces had risen from under approximately 20,000 in 1880 to approximately 72,000
in 1906. It also noted that the divorce rate per 100,000 in the population in the United States
exceeded the nearest country by a factor of more than two. Our nearest competitors were Swit-
zerland and then France, Denmark, and Germany. Although advocates of the uniform legisla-
tion could have used the data in the 1909 report, it appears that they had run out of steam by
that time, having tried without success for several years to get the 1907 legislation adopted.
78. AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A LAW UNIFORM WITH THE LAWS OF OTHER
STATES RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AND DIVORCE PROCEDURE.
Section 1. Divorce from the bond of marriage shall not be granted for other causes than
the following: Adultery, bestiality, sodomy, impotency, extreme cruelty, habitual drunken-
ness or intoxication, whether from the use of alcoholic drinks or of drugs, conviction of
felony with sentence of imprisonment for - years or more, and continuous desertion for at
least - years.
Section 2. No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to domicile of the
petitioner in this state that was not a ground for divorce in the State where the cause arose.
Section 3. No person shall be entitled to a divorce who has not had an actual bona-fide
residence in this State two years next before bringing petition or suit for a divorce, with the
actual intention of making this State his or her permanent home.
Section 4. No person shall be entitled to a divorce unless the defendant shall have been
personally served with process, or shall have entered an appearance in the case, or it shall
have been made to appear by the petitioner to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner
does not know the address nor the residence of the defendant, and has not been able to
ascertain either, after reasonable and due inquiry and search continued for one year; in
which case, the court may authorize notice to be given of the pendency of the petition for
divorce, by publication, in such manner as may be provided by law or by rule or special
order of the court.
Section 5. No divorce shall be granted upon default nor admissions by the pleadings nor
upon the uncorroborated testimony of either of the parties.
Section 6. After absolute divorce, either party may marry again; but no decree for abso-
lute divorce shall be finally entered or become operative, until three months after hearing
and decision upon the petition.
STATE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENcE, HELD AT BUFFALO, N.Y., Au-
GUST 25, 26 AND 28 1899, at 5-6 (1899) [hereinafter 1899 REPORT].
79. AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A LAW UNIFORM WITH THE LAWS OF OTHER
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In 1901, the 1900 law was superseded by two acts: "An Act To
Establish a Law Uniform With the Laws of Other States Relative to
Migratory Divorce"80 and "An Act To Establish a Law Uniform With
the Laws of Other States Relative to Divorce Procedure and Divorce
from the Bonds of Marriage.1
81
STATES RELATIVE TO DIVORCE PROCEDURE AND DIVORCE FROM THE
BONDS OF MARRIAGE.
Section 1. No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to the residence of the
complainant or defendant in this State, which was not a ground for divorce in the State
where the cause arose.
Sec. 2. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any cause arising in this State, who
has not had actual residence in this State for at least one year next before bringing suit for
divorce, with a bona fide intention of making this State his or her permanent home.
Sec. 3. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any cause arising out of this State
unless the complainant or defendant shall have resided within this State for at least two
years next before bringing suit for divorce, with a bona fide intention of making this State his
or her permanent home.
Sec. 4. No person shall be entitled to a divorce unless the defendant shall have been
personally served with process, if within this State, or if without this state, shall have had
personal notice duly proved and appearing of record, or shall have entered an appearance in
the case; but if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Court that the complainant does not
know the address nor the residence of the defendant and has not been able to ascertain
either, after reasonable and due inquiry and search, continued for six months after suit
brought, the court or judge in vacation may authorize notice by publication of the pendency
of the suit for divorce, to be given in manner provided by law.
Sec. 5. No divorce shall be granted solely upon default nor solely upon admissions by
the pleadings, nor except upon hearing before the Court in open session.
Sec. 6. After divorce either party may marry again, but in cases where notice has been
given by publication only, and the defendant has not appeared, no decree or judgment for
divorce shall become final or operative until six months after hearing and decision.
Sec. 7. Wherever the word "divorce" occurs in this act, it shall be deemed to mean
divorce from the bonds of marriage.
Sec. 8. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
STATE BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE TENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT SARATOGA
SPRINGS, N.Y., AUG. 25, 27, 28, 29, 1900, at 44-45 (1900).
80. AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A LAW UNIFORM WITH THE LAW OF OTHER
STATES RELATIVE TO MIGRATORY DIVORCE.
Section 1. No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to the residence of the
complainant or defendant in this state, which was not ground for divorce in the state where
the cause arose.
Section 2. The word "divorce" in this act shall be deemed to mean divorce from the
bond of marriage.
Section 3. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are her[e]by repealed.
1901 REPORT, supra note 42, at 27.
81. AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A LAW UNIFORM WITH THE LAWS OF OTHER
STATES RELATIVE TO DIVORCE PROCEDURE AND DIVORCE FROM THE
BONDS OF MARRIAGE.
Section 1. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any cause arising in this State,
who has not had actual residence in this State for at least one year next before bringing suit
for divorce, with a bona fide intention of making this State his or her permanent home.
Section 2. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any cause arising out of this State
unless the complainant or defendant shall have resided within this State for at least two
years next before bringing suit for divorce, with a bona fide intention of making this State his
or her permanent home.
Section 3. No person shall be entitled to a divorce unless the defendant shall have been
personally served with process, if within the State, or if without the State, shall have had
personal notice, duly proved and appearing of record, or shall have entered an appearance in
the case; but if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Court that the complainant does not
know the address nor the residence of the defendant and has not been able to ascertain
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The two acts of 1901 were merely the Act of 1900 divided in two
with a few added provisions. Although the 1899 draft contained a
provision on the grounds for divorce,82 these substantive provisions on
cause did not survive. Both the 1900 Act and the 1901 Acts are
merely procedural and jurisdictional; none of the three acts purports
to deal with the grounds for divorce. One can only guess why the
grounds that were included in the 1899 considerations were dropped
in 1900 and 1901.83 Perhaps this was the work of the New Yorkers,
who opposed any expansion beyond adultery as a basis for divorce.
84
As I have indicated above, 85 the act of 1900 was enacted nowhere
and the two acts of 1901 achieved a cumulative adoption by two states.
What part these acts played in the later deliberations in the congress of
1906 or in debates that preceded it is unclear. Yet most of the provi-
sions of the 1900 and 1901 acts appear in the 1907 uniform act. There
was little mention in the debates either of those laws or of the Com-
missioners. Indeed, as late as 1911, President Taft seems to have been
ignorant of the uniform laws and of the NCCUSL, despite the fact
that he was a lawyer and a judge.
86
During the first decade of the twentieth century the tide in favor of
restriction on divorce rose rapidly. In 1902 New York enacted a law
to require a three-month waiting period after the decree before a di-
vorce would become effective.87 In 1905 Governor Pennypacker of
either, after reasonable and due inquiry and search, continued for six months after suit
brought, the Court or Judge in vacation may authorize notice by publication of the pen-
dency of the suit for divorce, to be given in manner provided by law.
See. 4. No divorce shall be granted solely upon default nor solely upon admissions by
the pleadings, nor except upon hearing before the Court in open session.
Sec. 5. After divorce either party may marry again, but in cases where notice has been
given by publication only, and the defendant has not appeared, no decree or judgment for
divorce shall become final or operative until six months after hearing and decision.
Sec. 6. Wherever the word "divorce" occurs in this act, it shall be deemed to mean
divorce from the bond of marriage.
Sec. 7. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Id
82. See 1899 REPORT, supra note 78, at 5-6.
83. At the 1899 Convention, the original proposal was split into two acts: a "Bill Relating to
Causes" (§ 1 of the original proposal), and a "Bill Relating to Procedure" (§§ 2-6 of the original
proposal). 1899 REPORT, supra note 78, at 6-7. The bill relating to causes was never reconsid-
ered by the Commissioners. The bill relating to procedure was substantially adopted as the 1900
Act.
84. A letter from representatives of the Denver clergy to the Commissioners stated: "we
pray you that.., when the law as to 'causes for divorce' will be further considered that you will
use your influence to secure the recognition only of such grounds for divorce as are in accordance
with the law of Christ." 1901 REPORT, supra note 42, at 10. The letter does not indicate which
causes accord with the law of Christ and which do not.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
86. Corrects Taft on Divorce - Says Uniform Laws on Causes Exist in 90 Per Cent. of States,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1911, at 3, col. 2 [hereinafter Corrects Taft on Divorce].
87. 1902 N.Y. Laws Chap. 951, which reads in pertinent part: "No final judgment annulling
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Pennsylvania, together with others, proposed a national congress on
the uniform divorce laws.""
THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
The interests of women were, of course, intimately involved in the
divorce laws and their interests were not necessarily the same as those
of men. Because there were few women in the legislatures, writing for
the national publications, or in the bar, little was reported on any pe-
culiarly female view of divorce law. The only voice identified as
speaking for women as a group at this time was the National Council
of Women. In 1895 this group discussed the prospect of the national
divorce law at its meeting in Washington, D.C. 89 Clearly, many at the
1895 meeting raised their voices in criticism of the existing divorce
law, but the nature of their criticisms is not clear. One representative
complained "'[tihat the laws men have made without conferring with
women have been unequal and most cruel to women.' "9 The report
of this meeting does not explain whether the critic was advocating
more generous divorce law or perhaps the converse - greater restric-
tions on migratory divorces by men. 9'
Some at the 1895 meeting proposed that marriage should be harder
to obtain and should be attended with some "education" as a solution
to failed marriages. Others explicitly objected to restrictions on re-
marriage: "'Have you given the churches the right to say that be-
cause a woman has once sought happiness and failed, she shall not
attempt to get it again?' "92 The speaker then claimed that a man
could be remarried, but a woman could not. It is unclear to which
state law she was referring.
In their 1905 meeting, the Council apparently was aware of the
proposal for a national congress on uniform divorce law. It adopted a
resolution "to co-operate with the Church and State to ascertain what
are the chief causes which induce or lead up to divorce."' 93 The resolu-
a marriage, or divorcing the parties and dissolving a marriage, shall be entered... until after the
expiration of three months after the filing of the decision of the court or report of the referee.";
see also New Divorce Law Operates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1902, at 16, col. 2.
88. Address of the Committee on Resolutions, Appointed by the Divorce Congress, at Washing-
ton, D.C, February 19-22, 1906, in Address--& Resolutions, supra note 41, at 2.
89. Women Discuss Divorce - Ways for Reform Suggested at the National Council N.Y.
Times, Mar. 1, 1895, at 14, col. 1.
90. Id. (quoting Mrs. Dietrick).
91. In the headline, the Times points out that "Many of the Speakers [are] Unmarried." Id
92. Id. (quoting Mrs. Harriet A. Shinn).
93. Miss Anthony for Divorce - Objects to National Women's Council Resolution Against It,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1905, at 1, col. 5.
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tion went on to condemn divorce as "known to cause most disastrous
results in the family and State."'9
4
The most interesting aspect of the 1905 meeting is the reported
dissent of the noted feminist, Susan B. Anthony. The New York Times
reported that Ms. Anthony "was on her feet before the reading of the
resolution [described above] had been concluded. ' 95 She commented
I do not consider divorce an evil by any means.... It is just as much a
refuge for women married to brutal men as Canada was once a refuge
from brutal masters. I will never vote for a resolution that will cut wo-
men off from refuge from designing and brutal men.
96
Her statement is the only explicit endorsement of divorce and rec-
ognition of the possibility that divorce could be a virtue that I have
found in any of the public discussion, commentary, or in the debate of
the Congress of 1906. It did not carry the day even with her female
colleagues, who instead adopted the resolution that condemned di-
vorce as "disastrous."
THE "CONGRESS" OF 1906
The Pennsylvania legislature, acting at the behest of President
Roosevelt, authorized Governor Pennypacker to request the coopera-
tion of other states in drafting a uniform divorce law.97 Forty states,
along with the District of Columbia and the territory of New Mexico,
responded, sending delegates to Washington, D.C., in February
1906.98 Concluding that "the matter falls properly within the jurisdic-
tion of the Commissioners," 99 Governor Higgins of New York for-
warded Governor Pennypacker's proposal to the senior New York
representative of the NCCUSL. Some of the delegates to this Con-
gress were Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.100
The first session of the Congress was held in Washington the week




97. Address of the Committee on Resolutions; Appointed by the Divorce Congress, at Washing-
ton, D.C, February 19-22, 1906, in Address & Resolutions, supra note 41, at 2.
98. Id
99. Higgins on Divorce Law - Governor, in a Letter, Approves Plan for Uniform Legislation,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1905, at 6, col. 6.
100. Of the 32 delegates to the November, 1906 adjourned meeting of the Congress on Di-
vorce, 12 are listed in the 1905 NCCUSL Handbook as Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ADJOURNED MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON UNIFORM DI-
VORCE LAWS HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, PA., NOVEMBER 13, 1906, at 6-8 (1907) [hereinafter
ADJOURNED MEETING].
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1906 in Philadelphia. In February of 1906 the New York Times ap-
plauded the Congress as follows:
It is of course a National scandal that couples should be living in any
State one or both of whom would be in contempt of the courts of that
State for the Constitutional provision that credit shall attach in the
courts of any State to the judicial proceedings of any other State. The
case is worse than that. Contempt of court is often a technical offense
and sometimes it attests manhood and good citizenship. But contempt
of law is one of the most serious conditions that can happen under a
government of law. And contempt of law is what the existing welter of
legislation on the question of divorce inevitably induces. 101
The work of the National Congress consisted of seventeen resolu-
tions adopted in the February sessions in Washington and a proposed
uniform act debated and adopted in the November meetings in
Philadelphia.
The uniform law carried forward and strengthened some of the
provisions in the 1901 Commissioners' uniform acts designed to re-
strict migratory divorce and to assure that absent defendants received
notice. Unlike the 1901 acts, this act specified six bases for divorce. 10 2
It also recognized absolute divorce as different from separation (a
mensa et thoro).
103
A New Yorker favoring more liberal divorce laws might conclude
that the act contained good news and bad news. It liberalized divorce
by adding five grounds in addition to adultery, but restricted the op-
portunities to divorce by limiting migratory decrees and by including a
one-year waiting period after the decree before finality. To the extent
101. For Uniform Divorce Laws, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1906, at 8, col. 2 (editorial). Removed
80 years from that language it is hard to tell exactly what the Times is condemning. Perhaps its
reference to "contempt of law" refers to collusive allegations necessary to achieve divorce in
jurisdictions where the causes for divorce are quite limited.
102. Section 3.
The causes for divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be:
a. Adultery.
b. Bigamy, at the suit of the innocent and injured party to the first marriage.
c. Conviction and sentence for crime by a competent court having jurisdiction,
followed by a continuous imprisonment for at least two years, or in the case
of indeterminate sentence, for at least one year: Provided, That such
conviction has been the result of trial in some one of the states of the United
States, or in a Federal Court, or in some one of the territories, possessions or
courts subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or in some foreign
country granting a trial by jury, followed by an equally long term of
imprisonment.
d. Extreme cruelty, on the part of either husband or wife, such as to endanger
the life or health of the other party and render cohabitation unsafe.
e. Wilful desertion for two years.
f. Habitual drunkenness for two years.
,4n Act Regulating Annulment of Marriage and Divorc in Address & Resolutions, supra note 41,
at 22-23.
103. Id. at 22 (distinguishing "divorce from the bonds of matrimony, or divorce a vinculo
matrimonit " from "[d]ivorce from bed and board, or divorce a mensa et thoro. "')
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that he saw good news, the reader from New York would be wrong.
The national congress did not intend to liberalize divorce or to expand
the opportunity for it in any respect. In one of the earliest concessions
to a powerful and unbending state - an act now painfully familiar to
the Commissioners '0 4 - the national congress apparently bowed to
the wishes of states such as New York and South Carolina, for resolu-
tion 6 reads as follows:
While the following causes for... divorce from the bonds of matrimony
... seem to be in accordance with the legislation of a large number of
American states, this Congress, desiring to see the number of causes re-
duced rather than increased, recommends that no additional causes
should be recognized in any state; and in those states where causes are
restricted, no change is called for .... 10s
Thus the New Yorker would receive the bitter medicine of the an-
timigratory, antiremarriage rules without the sugar of the additional
five grounds for divorce. Notwithstanding the resolution stating the
intention of the Congress, the proposed act lists six causes for divorce
and may have been interpreted by the readers who did not know of the
resolution to be an exhortation for the expansion of the causes for di-
vorce in states like New York.
There appear to have been no members of the Congress who be-
lieved that divorce laws should be liberalized. In its deliberations the
only voice in favor of expansion of certain of the rights of divorce on
behalf of women in even a limited way is that of the Reverend Crane, a
female representative from the State of Michigan.'
°0
THE 1907 AcT
To understand the ways in which the proposed act (adopted by the
Commissioners as their uniform act in 1907)107 would have restricted
104. Recently, for example, the NCCUSL decided to incorporate the changes made by Cali-
fornia to article 2A of the UCC into the uniform version. The NCCUSL reasoned that "uni-
formity was more important than the relatively minor policy and language differences" reflected
in the California amendments, and if a powerful state such as California enacted a version differ-
ent from the rest of the country, true uniformity would not exist. Miller, UCC Article 2A and Its
Uniform Amendments UCC BuLL. Apr. 1991, at 1, 2 (1991).
105. Resolutions Adopted by the National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws, in Address &
Resolutions, supra note 41, at 17.
106. Reverend Crane was concerned that because a woman was required to go wherever her
husband chose, she might end up in a state that permitted divorce only under very restricted
circumstances, or perhaps not at all. She proposed an amendment to § 8(b) of the Act, which
disallowed divorce in any state on a ground not recognized in the state where the cause of action
arose, see id. at 24-25, as follows: "an injured wife, having returned to her ante-nuptial domicile,
and having there resided continuously for two years, may be granted relief according to the laws
of such domicile." Adjourned Meeting, supra note 100, at 95. The amendment was rejected,
primarily because of "the possibility of its opening the door to other larger abuses." Id. at 113
(comments of Amasa Eaton).
107. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEED-
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divorce, consider several of its sections. 108 First, the articulation of
the grounds for divorce might have restricted the bases for divorce
even in jurisdictions that had recognized most of those listed. As an
example, section 3 granted divorce apart from desertion, drunkenness,
conviction, bigamy, and adultery, only for "[e]xtreme cruelty on the
part of either... such as to endanger the life or health of the other
party or to render cohabitation unsafe."'' 09 This is not necessarily the
cruelty that had been recognized on the frontier prior to 1906110; cer-
tainly it is not the tepid "mental cruelty" that became a widespread
basis for divorce later in the century. 1
Second, section 8 generally required one to have been a bona fide
resident of a state for two years prior to the commencement of an
action there.' 12 Third, this same section required that the plaintiff's
cause be recognized as a basis for divorce in the jurisdiction where that
party resided at the time the cause of action arose for it to be the basis
for a divorce in the forum state.
113
Fourth, section 12 required a public hearing before a court.
1" 4
Presumably the antidivorce advocates hoped that the fear of such pub-
licity and embarrassment would inhibit the inclination to divorce.
Fifth, section 13 permitted the court to appoint a "disinterested
attorney" to defend uncontested cases. 15 Is this intended as an anti-
dote to collusion? Probably. Section 14 further attacks collusion by
requiring "affirmative proof" in addition to the admissions of the de-
fendant,116 and section 15 requires that "no record or evidence in any
case shall be impounded." 117 Salacious journalists would have the
right to expose the plaintiff and the defendant!
iNGs OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 120-30 (1907) [hereinafter 1907 PROCEEDINGS].
108. See An Act Regarding Annulment of Marriage and Divorce, in Address & Resolutions,
supra note 41, at 21-29 (text of the Act).
109. Id at 22-23.
110. For example, South Dakota included infiction of "grievous mental suffering" as a
ground for divorce. 2 S.D. STAT. ANN. § 3472 (1901); see also supra notes 49-57 and accompa-
nying text.
111. An Illinois judge expressed concern that, with the introduction of mental cruelty as a
grounds for divorce in Illinois, "all the 'Excedrin Headaches" would become grounds for di-
vorce. Monroe, Mental Cruelty. The Judge in Search ofa Precept, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 52, 54
(1969).
112. An Act RegardingAnnulment of Marriage and Divorce, in Address & Resolutions, supra
note 41, at 24-25.
113. Id
114. Id at 26.
115. Id.
116. Id at 27.
117. Id
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Finally, section 17 provided a one-year waiting period after the
entry of the decree before it became final.1 8 This rule would prevent
remarriage for one year after the decree.
If one accepts the Congress' Resolution 6 that the portions of the
law on causes of divorce should not be enacted in any state where they
would add to the causes, nothing in the uniform law expands the right
to divorce and much restricts it. On the other hand, the presence of
the six grounds for divorce in the uniform law and their recognition as
common to most of the states may have given the law a threatening
quality to conservatives in states like New York.1 9 The Right Rever-
end Doane had foreseen this problem as early as 1899: "[t]he defect,
which is exactly the danger of any uniform law, is the suggestion to
allow remarriage to either party, and the addition to the one cause,
possibly permissible, of four other causes."1 20
Initially, at least, the uniform law appears to have been warmly
received by politicians. Early in 1907 a committee from the national
congress presented the act to President Theodore Roosevelt. The New
York Times reported that "[t]he President, who is in friendly accord
with all efforts to lessen the divorce evil and to limit the causes of
divorce, had a long talk with the committee."1 21
In some circles that warm endorsement for uniform divorce law
and for the reform of the existing law seems to have existed even be-
yond 1910. In 1911 President Taft announced a 10,000 mile tour to
urge the necessity of a uniform law on divorce. 122 As late as 1913 the
New York Times reported on a conference presided over by an Episco-
palian bishop and attended by "prominent church and social workers
of various faiths and denominations." 1 23 Among those present was
118. Id.
119. All the same, the question before the convention is one of great difficulty. The prob-
lem of the convention is to propound some project of divorce which, "ex proprio vigore," on
account of its intrinsic reasonableness and equity, shall commend itself to the sense of equity
and to the sense of reasonableness of all the representatives of all the States in this Union.
But the existing difference in the statutes of the different States shows that they have taken
widely different views upon this question. It indicates that there is no common denomina-
tor. If the convention shall succeed in arriving at a common denominator, without doubt it
will have deserved very well of the whole country. At present a man, or a woman, may be a
malefactor, or malefactress, in one state and a blameless citizen in another. But the effort to
find a common standard which shall "impose itself" is at all events laudable.
For Uniform Divorce Laws; supra note 101.
120. Doane, supra note 64.
121. President Talky Divorce - Committee Presents to Him the Plan of the Recent Confer-
ence N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1907, at 4, col. 2.
122. See Corrects Taft on Divorce, supra note 86. It appears from the report that President
Taft may have been ignorant of the uniform law drafted by the National Congress and adopted
by the Commissioners in 1907.
123. Evils of Divorce Shown in Figure N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1913, at 9, col. 2.
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Reverend Francis M. Moody "who has been leading the agitation for
uniform divorce laws in the West." 124 In what must have been one of
the earliest eastern condemnations of the general moral deprivation of
Californians, Reverend Moody condemned "the Pacific Coast" as "the
greatest divorce centre not only of this country, but of the entire
world." 125 He also criticized the Midwest.
The Commissioners adopted the 1906 act of the National Congress
as a Uniform Act in 1907.126 In 1907 it was adopted in Delaware and
New Jersey, and in 1909 in Wisconsin.1 27 In the state legislatures it
appears that the tide for divorce restriction apparently had never risen,
or, if it had, was rapidly falling by 1907. Although Bishop Doane and
other prominent persons specifically endorsed the Uniform Act and
encouraged the New York legislature to pass it, the bill was reported
to be "smothered in committee" in New York.128 -
By 1909 scholars were publicly challenging the premise of the en-
tire divorce restriction effort. In that year Professor George Elliott
Howard of the University of Nebraska published an article in the
American Journal of Sociology entitled "Is the Freer Granting of Di-
vorce an Evil?"1 29 This public consideration of the possible virtues of
divorce shows that the moralistic grip of the churchmen and others
who advocated restriction on divorce was weakening. Commenting
upon a 1908 divorce study by the Census Bureau and upon a col-
league's commentary, Professor Howard noted:
We need not beg our premise. Divorce is about three times as frequent
as it used to be. This is the salient fact. In Europe, too, while the
number of divorces is relatively small, generally the rate is rising.
Clearly we are face to face with a phenomenon, huge, portentous. What
is its meaning, how should it be interpreted?
130
Using the data collected in the 1908 Census report and other data,
Professor Howard argued that "imperfect legislation and faulty judi-
cial procedure are not a principal cause of the divorce movement." 13'
124. Id
125. Id.
126. 1907 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 107, at 29; Report of the Committee on Marriage and
Divorce in iaL at 120-30.
127. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 316 (1928).
128. Decency, Uniform Laws, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1910, at 10, col. 1 (letter to thb editor).
129. Howard, Is the Freer Granting of Divorce an Evil?, 14 AM. J. Soc. 766 (1909).
130. Id. at 766 (emphasis omitted). Invoking Luther, Milton, and others, Professor Howard
argued that far from being an evil, "divorce is prescribed as a remedy for a social malady." Id at
767.
131. Id (different typeface in original).
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He noted that over the previous two decades
more stringent provisions for notice to the defendant have been made,
longer terms of previous residence for the plaintiff are required, more
satisfactory [Le., more stringent] conditions of remarriage after the de-
cree are prescribed, while some of the worst "omnibus" clauses in the list
of statutory causes have been repealed.
132
"Nevertheless," he stated, "the divorce rate has gained a threefold ve-
locity."'1 33 Continuing this heretical analysis, he noted that only about
fifteen percent of divorces between 1887 and 1906 were contested.134
He concluded with the grossest heresy that the figures disclosed a
"tendency toward dissolution of wedlock by mutual consent or even at
the demand of either spouse."1 35
Professor Howard also noted that the most recent statistics con-
firmed what Colonel Wright found in 1889 - that migratory divorces
comprised only a small percentage of all the cases. In an earlier day
eighty percent of divorces occurred in the same state where the parties
had married.1 36 Of the twenty percent who married in one state and
were divorced in another, the greater share must have moved for rea-
sons other than to achieve a divorce.
1 37
Professor Howard argued that the rise in divorce was caused by
underlying social conditions, by changes in the relations between men
and women, and was not related to the law. He agreed with those who
claimed that easy and thoughtless marriage is one of the causes of di-
vorce, but he concluded that divorce "is merely a healing medicine for
marital ills. '138
Professor Howard's discussion was not merely a dry discourse in
an academic journal, for other prominent participants in the divorce
debate published commentaries in the same journal. Among them
were the Reverend Dr. Samuel Dike,139 Rabbi Krauskopf,14° and Wal-
ter George Smith.141 Clearly the article had got the attention of some
132. Id. at 768.
133. Md
134. I at 769.
135. Id
136. Id at 770.
137. Id
138. Id at 776.
139. Id. Reverend Dr. Dike was a major proponent of uniform divorce laws, and Corre-
sponding Secretary of the National Divorce Reform League. See supra text accompanying notes
61 and 62.
140. Krauskopf, supra note 74.
141. Id. at 789. Mr. Smith was president of the NCCUSL from 1909-1912, and a delegate
from Pennsylvania to the National Congress on Divorce in 1906, as well as ex-president of the
Federation of Catholic Societies of Pennsylvania.
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of the major players in the debate. With the exception of Mr. Smith,
the commentators conceded the power of Professor Howard's
arguments. 142
How directly and to what extent this article and others like it influ-
enced the fate of the uniform law in the state legislatures is unclear.
Its report in the New York Times 143 shows that it did not suffer the
dismal fate of most academic writing. Surely it would have been a
powerful tool in the hands of one who was opposed to additional legal
restrictions on divorce. Perhaps it was used by such persons in the
debates in the various legislatures; I cannot tell.
By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the reform
movement was running out of steam. After 1909 no state enacted the
1907 uniform law. Imperceptibly the piecemeal restrictions on divorce
that had been enacted in New York and elsewhere reversed them-
selves. Ultimately the divorce laws were greatly liberalized in almost
every state, in part as a result of the next grand divorce law effort by
the NCCUSL in its uniform act published in 1973.144
What can one learn from this story? That a law passed by a "Na-
tional Congress," indorsed by two presidents, warmly advocated by
various church groups, and by a prominent national women's organi-
zation, could achieve only three state adoptions should concern the
National Conference of Commissioners. Let us examine the facts I
have recited and speculate about the lessons for other laws in the fail-
ure of the divorce reform legislation.
THE MUTE OPPOSITION
The uniform divorce laws may have failed to achieve substantial
passage in the states because they were never favored by a majority of
the citizens nor by most of the legislators. But how could that be?
The history shows vocal and extensive support for more restrictive di-
vorce laws by churchmen, church organizations, a national women's
organization, two presidents of the United States, and a host of distin-
guished lawyers and judges. The expressed opposition, on the other
hand, is faint and barely noted.1 45
142. See supra notes 139-41.
143. The New Doctrine of Divorce, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1909, at 8, col. 1.
144. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DrvoRcE Acr, 9 U.L.A. 156 (1973). Section 302 of the Act
provides that if the court finds that the marriage is "irretrievably broken," a divorce decree may
be entered. That is the only provision regarding grounds for divorce in the Act. Section 303(e)
abolishes defenses to divorce such as collusion. See generally O'Connell, Marriag Divorce and
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 17 N.Y. L.F. 983 (1972).
145. Ms. Anthony and Professor Howard are rare examples.
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Is it plausible that the absence of articulate opposition meant only
that such expression was suppressed? The tone of the criticism of di-
vorce by almost all of the advocates of the new legislation is captured
in the following statement:
[If this Church can by any language or by any enactment of canon or
rubric rid herself of all responsibility for remarriage after divorce, she
will have set up a barrier against the foul tide of the desecration of mar-
riage, of the degradation of the family, of the deterioration of the home,
which must turn the current aside until it finds its way where it belongs
into the sewage, and not into the sources of supply. 146
The President himself found the lax administration of the divorce laws
resulted in a "diminishing regard for the sanctity of the marriage
relation."147
Listen to the advocates decry the 'youl tide" and "sewage" hear
them invoke the "sanctity of marriagel" This righteous and moralistic
tone that characterized the discourse of most of the advocates of the
legislation may have silenced the opposition. Its tone left little room
for reasonable differing views. Only a moral cretin could argue against
the "sanctity of marriage" and for the "evil" of divorce. Similar
claims are made today concerning the debate on college campuses
where some maintain that certain arguments are "politically correct"
and therefore readily advanced, while others, not "politically correct,"
are stifled. 14
8
One can identify at least two groups who would have favored more
generous divorce laws and who presumably would have opposed the
uniform law of 1907 because of the restrictions it placed upon the
availability of divorce. First were women in states such as New York
where the only ground for divorce was adultery. In the words of one
commentator, these women were "yoked" irretrievably to their hus-
bands. 149 As long as the husband did not commit provable adultery,
wives were made to tolerate a husband's drunkenness, cruelty, and
even desertion.
In the entire debate on the divorce law one sees the woman's posi-
146. Doane, supra note 64. Another example of the moralistic quality of criticism of divorce
is this letter to the editor of the New York Times, commenting on the increase in divorce from
1867 to 1886 as reported by Colonel Wright's study: "If any contagious disease should show a
like increase the country would be panic-stricken. Yet the great majority of people are absolutely
indifferent to a disease infinitely more deadly, for it threatens the morality and intellect of the
race, if not its existence." Montgomery, supra note 77.
147. Address, in Address and Resolutions, supra note 41, at 2 (quoting President Roosevelt).
148. "There is no escape from complex politics on campus, the forum for the debate over
'political correctness' and whether it stifles free speech." DePalma, Higher Education Feels the
Heat, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1991, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
149. Krauskopf, supra note 74, at 781.
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tion expressed in only two circumstances. First was Susan B.
Anthony's opposition to the resolution at the National Council of Wo-
men.150 The second expression on behalf of women came in the delib-
erations of the National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws in
Philadelphia.' 51
To a woman who was experienced only as a homemaker, commit-
ted to her children and who would have had a difficult time earning a
living outside the home, the inability to get a divorce was more serious
than it would have been for a similarly abused husband. Presumably
the husband who suffered similar abuse at the hands of his wife could
simply desert her, find employment elsewhere, and move on to a new
existence. While that might not be a satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem even for the husband, it was much more likely to be available to
him than to the wife.
It is likely that there was a second large number of people in sullen
and silent opposition to the laws restricting divorce. These were not
the women yoked to the men or the men willing to desert wives they
could not divorce, but men who wished divorce and were unwilling to
desert their wives and families. They also include divorced men and
women in states with generous laws. Then, as now, the population in
restrictive states must have had ample representation of those who
wished divorce but could not get it. In states with more lax divorce
laws there must have been many who had received divorces and were
happy for it. None of these people appears to have spoken out and no
one spoke for them, but surely they were everywhere - among the
judiciary, the bar, and in the legislature. Even if the moralistic tone of
the debate silenced these people, it is unlikely to have changed their
views about the virtues of divorce.
One who is going to get his laws passed ex proprio vigore must
know the nature and the strength of the opposition to any such laws.
Almost by hypothesis any strong opposition to a uniform law means
that it will fail. The divorce laws tell us that when the public debate
about a law has a moralistic and righteous tone, one must be careful
about drawing inferences. The Uniform Divorce Law went nowhere;
quite plausibly it went nowhere because the women's objections were
never expressed and because the opposition of a larger number of men
and women was also never expressed, all due to the moralistic tone of
the advocates that shamed the opponents into silence.
One can imagine a number of laws that might stimulate a similar
150. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 106.
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debate in today's society, a debate in which the advocates might claim
moral righteousness and successfully shame their opponents. Debates
about affirmative action, gender discrimination, and discrimination on
the basis of sexual preference might have this quality. Similar dangers
could arise in the debate concerning discrimination on the basis of age,
about laws having to do with those carrying the AIDS virus, and con-
ceivably even with respect to laws such as that now under considera-
tion by the Conference concerning employment at will. 152
Presumably most of the laws that will be proposed by the Commis-
sioners will not cause such debate. Yet when the laws do tread on
such ground, it is important for the Commissioners to examine not
merely the public debate, but also the private one, and to use care that
the advocates of a particular position do not shame the opponents into
silence. That this was the fate of the divorce law in New York is inti-
mated by the report in the New York Times that the uniform law was
"smothered in committee." 153 By a man "yoked" to a shrew? By a
migrating divorcee?
SHIFTING DATA AND SHIFrING PERCEPTIONS
It is self-evident that any uniform law having a chance for adop-
tion depends on a perception that such a law is needed. Throughout
the debate on divorce from 1890 until 1909 almost all of the propo-
nents of the law agreed that divorce was too frequently granted, too
frequently collusive, and that there were too many migratory divorces.
Moreover, almost all of the proponents seemed to have agreed that
more stringent laws would cure those problems.
Yet from 1889, when Colonel Wright's study of divorce was pub-
lished, that foundation was already being undermined.15 4 Even Rever-
end Dike, one of the strong advocates of uniform divorce laws,
conceded that the 1889 study showed that migratory divorces were
not a major problem. Yet the law of 1900 and the laws of 1901 were
aimed almost entirely at migratory divorces. Apparently the message
did not reach the ears of the Commissioners.
More troublesome for the enactment of the 1907 law was Professor
Howard's analysis in 1909.155 He pointed out that divorce had been
increasing rapidly and at an unchecked rate during the same time
when the states were adding barriers to divorce laws to make divorce
152. Draft Uniform Employment-Termination Act, August 2-9, 1991, I.E.R.M. (BNA)
540:21.
153. Decency, supra note 128.
154. See Howard, supra note 129, at 770; Divorce Reform League, supra note 61.
155. See supra note 129.
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more difficult to achieve. He thus challenged the very basis of the
proponents' claim that stronger law would diminish divorce.
Such criticism should make all legislators humble. Exactly how a
law will affect the behavior of citizens to be governed by that law is
almost always a complex question to which the answer is difficult to
foretell. One sees exactly this debate concerning intended versus ac-
tual effects with respect to the firearms legislation,15 6 with respect to
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code1 57 and with respect to hundreds
of other laws, large and small.
Data about the need for and probable impact of a particular law
can be a strength or a weakness for an elite legislature. Persuasive
data showing a need for a law and giving a reasonable basis for conclu-
sion about its effect can be a powerful tool. But the revelation of po-
tential and unintended consequences of such a law can easily
undermine it.
That professionals such as Professor Howard attacked the founda-
tions of the divorce legislation and were successful in persuading some
of the advocates of that legislation' 58 may have hastened the death of
the Uniform Divorce Law. Surely Professor Howard was an unusual
academic, for he was able not only to get several of the major partici-
pants in the national debate to write commentaries to be published
with his article in the Journal of American Sociology, but he also at-
tracted the attention of the New York Times. His analysis and the
concessions some of the proponents of the uniform legislation made to
his analysis would have made powerful arguments against the adop-
tion of the uniform legislation - at least in states where more liberal
laws prevailed at the time.
156. Advocates of gun control legislation maintain that such legislation will reduce the
number of handgun deaths in this country. The National Rifle Association, on the other hand,
insists that "[if guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns." See, ag., Sullum, Gun Bans
Won't Stop the Gunman, L.A. Times, July 2, 1990, at B7, col. 5. The NCCUSL faced a similar
problem in 1940 with its Uniform Pistol Act. Because of objections to the Act from all sides of
the issue, only two states adopted it. Report of Section of Uniform Torts and Criminal Law Acts
in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFoRM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 154 (1948).
157. The UCCC set interest rate ceilings well above those of most states, assuming that in-
creased competition between lenders would keep rates below the maximum levels. To appreciate
the diversity of reaction to this proposal, compare Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus.
LAW. 957, 961 (1970) ("The available evidence in the only area of consumer credit in which the
law today permits at least limited competition, that is, the financing of automobile loans, tends to
prove the validity of the Code approach.") with Dennon, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Bombshell 22 PER. FIN. L.Q. REP. 125, 128 (1968) ("Once a ceiling is fixed, the greedy will
rush in to take every advantage of increased yields as soon as there is a statutory foundation.").
158. See, eg., Howard, supra note 129, at 776 (comments of Rev. Dike).
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THE BLANKET Is Too SMALL
Ultimately the divorce law blanket may have been too small to
cover all of the people who sought to sleep under it. How wide should
a law be? When has the blanket been pulled so far in one direction
that those who originally were covered on the other side are now
uncovered?
When the uniform divorce legislation was proposed in 1900, 1901,
and 1907, New York was the most populous and powerful state. Its
law permitted divorce only on the ground of adultery. Clergymen and
others from New York were among the strongest proponents of re-
strictions on migratory divorce and of the addition of other restric-
tions, such as a one-year waiting period after the decree before finality.
Yet the law that was proposed by the National Congress in 1906 and
adopted as the uniform law in 1907 contained five additional grounds
for divorce. Although the National Congress had stated in a resolu-
tion that it did not propose the expansion of the causes for divorce in
any jurisdiction, the uniform law included the six causes without any
restrictions. A law that would add five new grounds would have been
unacceptable to its most zealous advocates in states like New York. In
a 1907 report on the uniform law, the New York Times raised this
possibility:
Upon the whole, the moderation of the report, which will be objected to
by many of the most zealous advocates of restriction of divorce, is that
attribute of it which makes it likeliest of general adoption, and therefore
gives most promise of its usefulness. It is a report against which it is
very hard to make tenable objections. 159
To draft a statute that will be broad enough to accomplish most of
its original supporters' goals and yet to include the largest possible
number of additional supporters is the height of legislative art.160 This
159. For a Uniform Divorce Law, supra note 71. This problem had earlier been recognized in
the 1899 article by The Right Reverend William Croswell Doane. There the Right Reverend
Doane complained that "the defect which is exactly the danger of any uniform law is the sugges-
tion to allow marriage to either party and the addition to the one cause possibly permissible of
four other causes." Doane, supra note 64.
160. A similar problem aficted the Commissioners in their attempts to satisfy both the
debtor and the creditor interests in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Certain consumer cred-
itors had financed the original study for the UCCC and had been supporters of it. Among other
things, they wished to have uniform laws so they could use the same forms throughout the states.
They particularly wanted to have uniform usury laws and to have laws that would have permit-
ted entry into various local markets by national creditors who were closed out of those markets
by restrictive state licensing laws. Representatives of consumer debtors, on the other hand, saw
this legislation as a possibility to enlarge consumers' rights. See Dix, President's Committee on
Consumer Interests States Position on the UCCC; 23 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 13 (1968) (endorsing
the Code as beneficial to consumers).
The Commissioners attempted to draft a law broad enough to cover all the concerns. One
way to explain the failure of the UCCC is to conclude that the debtors pulled the blanket over
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art is practiced every day in the Congress and in the state legislatures
where the blanket is pulled back and forth by successive draft and
redraft in response to particular statements and complaints of various
interest groups.
For the Commissioners successfully to practice that art requires
more talent than is required either in the Congress or in the state legis-
latures. That is because the Commissioners must draft a law without
explicit current input from interested constituents, and, in some cases,
without even a clear understanding of the identity of all the interested
parties. To the extent that the Commissioners' drafting process is
open and to the extent that semiformal "advisors" are invited from
every potential interest group, the problem can be minimized. But it
remains a serious problem.
I suspect that many uniform acts, including the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code and the Uniform Firearms Act, were doomed to
failure for this reason. It is my guess that there was no conceivable set
of rules that could have been supported by the most zealous of the
consumer advocates and also by the most zealous of the creditor advo-
cates. Even the widest possible blanket could not have covered their
bed.
Although it is less obvious, that may also have been one of the
primary reasons for the failure of the Uniform Divorce Law. If the
strongest advocates of the law in places like New York and South Car-
olina - where divorce was already greatly restricted - feared that
the law's enactment would add not only restrictions on divorce, but
also new grounds for divorce, their support for it may have waned and
even disappeared.
PROFESSIONAL CRITICISM AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES OF
UNIFORM LEGISLATION
The debates over the Uniform Divorce Law included many state-
ments by lawyers and judges about the technical inadequacies of the
existing laws and about the inappropriate consequence of the lack of
uniformity. Judges and lawyers complained of the treatment of those
who had received invalid divorces and had become unknowing biga-
mists.161 They bemoaned the failure to grant full faith and credit to
out-of-state decrees. 162 They expressed concern about the collusive
themselves and off the backs of the consumer creditors, the act's original advocates who then
abandoned it.
161. Not Bigamy if You Wed Outside Stats supra note 69 (remarks of ex-Judge
Dittenhoefer).
162. Uniform Divorce Laws, supra note 69 (remarks of Judge Mattice).
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nature of divorces. 163 They made a variety of other technical objec-
tions to the existing divorce laws that might have been regarded as
meritorious, not only by advocates of more restrictive divorce laws but
also by proponents of more generous divorce laws.
What part did this professional opinion play in the debate on the
Uniform Divorce Law? It is not clear. Surely the most powerful and
zealous advocates (President Roosevelt and members of church
groups) wished for a divorce law that was more restrictive, not neces-
sarily more just. Yet these zealous advocates would have seized on the
technical arguments to use them as weapons against the proponents of
more generous divorce laws.
Whether these technical issues really played a role on their own is
impossible to know. Ultimately, of course, they were not enough -
even when combined with all the other arguments - to carry the day
on behalf of the uniform divorce legislation.
The experience of sundry other proposals by the uniform commis-
sioners shows that purely professional interests can be sufficient in cer-
tain circumstances. 164 My reading of the divorce debate and of the
debate concerning the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is that techni-
cal competence arguments are relatively weak. The pull to make the
law technically better is an engine of modest horsepower. Going up
even the smallest incline against debtor advocates or those who favor
more generous divorce laws, it is soon unable to move forward. When
there is only a modest incline and no opposition, as in the case of laws
concerning procedural issues in the courts, 165 this engine can carry its
load to the destination, but only in such circumstances. That the
Commissioners are likely to draft laws that are clearer, better under-
stood, and with more insight, should be regarded as an incidental vir-
tue, not as a force that will carry a uniform law to its destination.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the 107 uniform acts that have been adopted in
no more than ten states with the twenty-two that have been adopted in
more than forty states leaves one with many questions and few an-
swers about the power of the Commissioners. A close look at the his-
163. Reform in Divorce Laws supra note 68 (remarks of Justice Beekman).
164. The "lawyer and court acts" generally fit this definition. For example, the Uniform Act
to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, supra
note 36, not a topic likely to spark much controversy, has been enacted in every American juris.
diction, including Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. Record of Passage of Uni-
form and Model Acts as of September 30, 1990, in REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 19, at 110.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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tory of the Uniform Divorce Law gives only a few answers - and
those possibly unique to the times and mores of the turn of the cen-
tury. The growing power of the federal government both threatens the
Commissioners and gives them a new argument for their existence.
Yet, the most interesting lesson from the divorce acts is in the power
of an unspoken, ill-represented, and sullen opposition. The Commis-
sioners should never underestimate opposition, no matter how brutish
and inarticulate.
A second lesson lies in the writing of Professor Howard in 1909.
His assertion that a law will not do what its proponents expect, but
may do quite different things, is now a commonplace. Yet it is a com-
monplace often forgotten.166
At this writing the future of the Commissioners as an influential
elite legislature is in doubt. Conceivably the fear of a more powerful
centralized government will enhance their power. It is just as likely
that Congress and the federal agencies will snatch more and more
power from the Commissioners and from the states by enacting stat-
utes and adopting regulations. We may see the day when the federal
government will rule not only traditional state areas of worker's com-
pensation, torts, and insurance, but even the treasured commercial
law. I share the view of banks and others concerning the growing
power of the organs of the federal government. 167 I am hopeful that
others will see the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law as a wise and conservative alternative to federal regulation
and federal legislation.
166. One motivation for passing the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr, 7A U.L.A. 639
(1984), particularly § 3(b) of that Act, was to reject the rule laid down in Durrett v. Washington
Nat]. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). U.F.T.A. § 3 Com.(5). Durrett held that a nonjudi-
cial foreclosure sale of an insolvent mortgagor's property for 57.7% of its fair market value could
be rescinded as fraudulent, despite the absence of any evidence of collusion or other improper
behavior. Section 3(b) of the U.F.T.A. merely requires a "regularly conducted, non-collusive
foreclosure sale" to establish a lack of fraud. However, since federal bankruptcy law almost
always governs situations such as the one arising in Durrett, U.F.T.A.'s "reform," limited to state
law, will probably not achieve its goal. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
167. Everyone knows that one of the three most common lies is: "I am from the federal
government and I am here to help you."
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